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Abstract
The Norwegian National Strategy for Artificial Intelligence (NNSAI)
published in 2020 includes seven principles of ethical AI. This paper explores
whether those seven principles are stated in a clear enough way and are
feasible to be satisfied by a specific AI system. We build an implementation
of the Gale-Shapley algorithm to allocate kindergarten places in Bergen,
Norway. The presented solution is then evaluated against the ethical
principles from the NNSAI. We argue that it is difficult to respect all the
ethical principles when implementing a solution to a matching problem.
1 Introduction
The NNSAI, first published on January 14th 2020 [18], aims at providing a framework
for both public and private entities seeking to develop and use artificial intelligence.
It details applicable definitions and topics such as; data, data management, AI-
innovation, explainability, trustworthiness, frameworks, infrastructure, research areas,
current competencies, responsible use and security. The strategy concludes with a set
of ethical principles that need to be addressed when developing or implementing artifacts
that use any form of AI.
We explore to which extend can the ethical principles in the NNSAI
be satisfied by an algorithmic matching system for assigning children to
kindergartens.
The kindergarten allocation problem, like a lot of matching problems [13], has a
socially sensitive nature. Parents have a preference for their children when it comes
to kindergartens, and kindergartens have an obligation to prioritize select children to
comply with national legislation and local policies. There exists no national standard
regarding how the allocation process should take place, causing practises to vary between
municipalities. While national legislation is available through sources such as Lovdata1,
these do not offer details about allocation practices on the municipal level.
The municipality of Bergen uses a digital system to manage children’s applications,
but the allocation is done manually2. Allocators use a set of criteria3 based on children’s
This paper was presented at the NIK-2020 conference; see http://www.nik.no/.
1https://lovdata.no
2Disclosed in private communication, see GitHub repository under Appendix
3https://www.bergen.kommune.no/styringsdokument/2821046
attributes to assign priority. A subset of these criteria gives some children special
allocation priority. While we know that certain attributes contribute to an increased
priority for a child, exactly which are weighted the strongest, and how they are combined
is not necessarily disclosed.
On one hand automating the kindergarten allocation problem has the advantage of
reducing costs, saving time, and can enforce precision and transparency of the process.
On the other hand, algorithms cannot incorporate the same intuition and common sense
that trained professionals can. For a successful and efficient automation of matching,
automated algorithmic approaches and AI systems have to be adequately transparent and
explainable. Such requirements on AI systems are addressed by the recently drafted
ethical principles of the Norwegian National Strategy for Artificial Intelligence (NNSAI).
In summary, a successful allocation automation will need to fulfill the following criteria:
a) The system needs to allocate children to kindergartens automatically, with minimal
human intervention; b) The system needs to conduct said allocation and follow the
existing national and local policies, which are considered ethical and fair at the time of
the implementation; c) The system needs to adhere to the NNSAI ethical principles.
The allocation of kindergarten places is a problem most commonly modeled as a two-
sided matching problem. Such problems are derivatives of the original stable marriage
problem proposed by David Gale and Lloyd Shapley in 1962. Because this is well
accepted and standard approach [2, 1, 3], we implement a kindergarten allocation system
using the Gale-Shapley algorithm [9]. Our implementation has been built on available
information about how kindergarten allocation is currently being performed and respects
most of the legislation and policies applicable to the municipality of Bergen.
The goal of our implementation is not to evaluate how good the Gale-Shapley
algorithm is for kindergarten allocation. This is a standard well tested algorithm. We
build a prototype that is detailed enough to allow us to test whether the NNSAI principles
are feasible to satisfy in a matching type problem. Our contribution is an evaluation of
the ethical principles of NNSAI with respect to a concrete example of an AI system.
2 Preliminaries
The Gale-Shapley algorithm
The kindergarten allocation problem is an instance of the well known stable marriage
problem [13]. The stable marriage problem is the problem of finding a one to one match
between two sets of individuals. A solution to the problem is proposed by David Gale
and Lloyd Shapley in their seminal work from 1962 [9] and it has been widely applied in
school contexts [2, 1, 3], but has also been used to solve otherwise difficult and morally
sensitive matching problems such as kidney exchange [13].
The kindergarten allocation problem we consider can be classified as a two sided
bipartite matching problem [13]. Bipartite meaning members of two disjoint sets of
agents are being matched, and two sided meaning each “side” has total preferences over
the members of the other “side”.
The Gale-Shapley algorithm works as follows on the original stable marriage problem.
We assume there exist a set of men and a set of women that need to be matched. In the first
round, each man proposes to his most preferred woman. If a woman receives more than
one proposal, she rejects all except the one that she has the highest preference for among
the proposers. The formed pairs are now temporary engagements. In the next round all
the rejected men propose to the next woman on their preference list. The women reject all
but their top preference from the new proposers, this includes the temporary fiancé. New
temporary engagements are (possibly) formed. This round is repeated until all women
has received a proposal, when this happens the engagements are declared final and the
algorithm terminates. All men and women will be matched if the number of men and
women are equal. The resulting match will be one that is best for all the men given they
are on the proposing side. This does not mean that every man will get their most preferred
woman, but they will get the most preferred available woman that they can. This does not
exclude that a man can get their least preferred woman. The reason for this is that all
women can have man Z as their lowest preference, and Z ends up having to propose to
his least preferred woman after being rejected by all the more preferred women. This
woman, if not engaged, will have to accept the proposal. This is still Z ′s best possible
match, since all other have rejected him.
The Gale-Shapley algorithm results in a stable match. Stability is defined as the state
when there exits no match where any of the agents can swap their partner with someone
else to get a better match [9].
We put the children in the match proponents. The Gale-Shapley algorithm favors
the proposing side of the two collections, as noted by Maggs and Sitaraman [16]. In a
balanced relationship this can be perceived as unfair, but because of the relation between
children and kindergartens, we considered it just to favor the children. The preferences of
the kindergatens over the children are derived from the municipal admission criteria.
In addition to stability, we require that the match is also fair. We consider that children
are treated fairly in connection with allocation to kindergartens places if: “All children are
treated in the same objective way in respect to kindergartens admission criteria, and only
judged based on these criteria when being allocated to kindergarten places”.
Municipal Criteria
The municipal criteria that need to be fulfilled in allocation describe what features
children should be judged by, namely prioritised, when being allocated to kindergartens.
The features are as follows: children with disabilities, children of guardians with severe
visual impairment, children under care of the Child Services, children of minority
language, children with single guardians, children with siblings in same kindergarten,
children of employees, location (living in same district as kindergarten) and age4.
3 Proposed System
Our system5 allocates children to kindergartens using the described Gale-Shapley
algorithm. The system takes two inputs: A list of children, each with a list of their
preferred kindergartens, and a list of kindergartens. The system outputs a list of all the
matches between children and kindergartens, and a waiting list if there are more children
than available places. The process is displayed in Figure 1. For the matching between
children and kindergarten places to work, two criteria needs to be fulfilled: a) There needs
to be an equal amount of children and kindergarten places; b) All preference orders, of
children over kindergartens and kindergartens over children, need to be total.
If there are more children than there are vacant kindergarten places, we create a
waiting list with a size equal to the places missing in the kindergartens. This ensures
4The features are translated and simplified admission criteria, gathered from the statutes for
Bergen Municipal kindergartens: https://www.bergen.kommune.no/styringsdokument/
2821046
5The system, its code and figures describing the system are available in the following GitHub repository
- https://github.com/benq66/ai_ethics_2020
Figure 1: System architecture, with details of the allocation process.
that we have virtually as many positions as we have children, satisfying the first criterion.
To satisfy the second criterion, we have created a scoring system to build preference lists
for the kindergarten places. This is a standard approach because the kindergartens do not
have preferences over the applicants in the true sense of the word.
We generate a preference list for each individual kindergarten and then all
kindergarten places (in this kindergarten) get a copy of this preference list. This system
is built according to the municipality’s policy, which is disclosed in the preliminaries
section. This system calculates a score for each child by assigning weights to the features
described in the policy. The features we use, and the weights we give them are accounted
for in the GitHub repository under the Figures directory.
The scoring system supports further customization by allowing for the assignment
of different weights to any number of the children’s features. The system calculates a
score per child for every kindergarten. The score is used to determine the positions of
the children in the preference lists of all the kindergartens. Using this score system, all
kindergartens will prefer the children that fulfill the most criteria for their kindergarten.
The kindergarten preference list will in practice be ordered after how many criteria
the children fulfill. If two children have the same score then time of application will
determine who gets the higher preference. A simplified example of how scoring affects a
kindergartens preference list is given in the GitHub repository. The waiting list acts as a
kindergarten and its preference list of children is random.
The matching algorithm firstly puts all children in the unmatched list. Then the head of
this list is selected, and the availability of its most preferred kindergarten is checked. If the
allocation is available then the child is assigned this place temporarily, and the algorithm
proceeds to the next entry. Eventually a conflict will arise where the child’s preferred
spot is occupied by some other child, in such an event their indices in the kindergarten’s
preference list are compared and the allocation is given to the child with the lowest index,
the losing party is then inserted back into the list of unmatched children. Since index
position in the preference list is used, there will be no collisions of children with equal
score. The algorithm iteratively continues in this fashion until all children have been
allocated to a kindergarten place, or assigned to the waiting list. The system traces all
steps of the matching algorithm, thus making it possible to investigate why a child was
assigned a specific allocation.
Our prototype simulates an allocation of 250 children with random values and
priorities. It can be accessed by visiting the following URL – http://wildboy.
uib.no/˜kud005/ACID/. A description of how to use the system is available
as well – https://github.com/benq66/ai_ethics_2020/blob/master/
Javascript/guidetoACIDfinal.pdf.
4 Evaluation
In this section we assess how well our system works in respect to the criteria that the
municipality of Bergen is obliged to satisfy. Next, we evaluate our system against the
ethical principles of the NNSAI.
System Evaluation
Our implementation of the Gale-Shapley algorithm is child-optimal meaning that the
children are given the first mover advantage in the match. To further evaluate the quality of
the match we need empirical testing. We can measure the result of the allocation process
by examining how many children are allocated to their highest prioritized kindergarten.
Our current system, based on synthetic data, assigns a first choice kindergarten to
approximately 60 percent of the children. The actual performance of the system would
require testing with real data.
It can be difficult to guarantee the interests of the kindergartens when the result of
the algorithm is child-optimal. We need to ensure that the kindergartens are not at such a
disadvantage that they fail to fulfill their obligations to the national and local governments.
This can only be accomplished with a careful crafting of the scoring system that generates
the “preferences” of the kindergartens over children. To be readily deployable our system
would require expert input and verification of the scoring system in addition to extensive
testing over real data.
The Norwegian National Strategy for Artificial Intelligence (NNSAI)
The NNSAI itself focuses on providing an overview of the current state of AI, its
components and general application in the context of Norwegian society. The part that
we are interested in is included near the end of the document and consists of seven ethical
principles regarding the development of trustworthy AI. For the AI-driven system to be
considered trustworthy it must be lawful, ethical and robust, according to the European
Commission’s high-level expert group [7].
We examine each of the seven ethical principles and analyze how applicable they are
in regards to the system that we have developed.
1) AI-based solutions must respect human autonomy and control. The first
principle consists of two main parts: (i) people should have the right to have an alternative
when using the AI-based system that makes impactful decisions on their life if they choose
not to use one, and (ii) that people should be included in the process of making said
decisions, and provide feedback on all the stages of this process.
The first part of this principle is not related to our system since the availability of
an alternative human-driven decision-making procedure depends on the municipality.
Currently, our system does not have such functionality. However, the final decision of
the system should be first verified by individuals before executing it, therefore, the first
principle is partially satisfied.
It can be concluded that this principle is mainly focusing on the requirement to include
the presence of human individuals in one or more stages of the algorithm, which impacts
the development of the AI-based system. Since this principle is specific enough, it is
clear what are the exact requirements, therefore the principle seems quite possible to
implement.
2) AI-based systems must be safe and technically robust. The second principle
is more abstract, it mainly advises to ensure that the system behaves as predictably and
reliably as possible. This is achieved by incorporating well-proven, well-established and
trustworthy techniques, concepts and software solutions during the development of the
system.
In the case of our system this principle is satisfied since the system uses a well-
known algorithm that has proven to provide meaningful results due to its stable matching
property [1]. However, it is not in any case ideal since it requires many additional tweaks
and adjustments due to the specific context in which the system is built.
As a result it can be assumed that this principle is a part of a good approach to
developing any system and therefore can be considered reasonable.
3) AI must take privacy and data protection into account. The third principle
implies the importance of following the “General Data Protection Regulation” (GDPR)
[20]. One of the ground rules imposed by GDPR is that “everything you do in your
organization must, by design and by default, consider data protection” [6]. It means that
a certain number of rules and terms such as data protection principles, accountability and
consent should be followed and respected when collecting and processing personal data.
Our system stores the data using the pseudo-anonymization technique, i.e. the entities
in the database are identified by pseudonyms instead of personal information. This is
considered as one of the ways to comply with the GDPR’s part about secure storage
of personal data [15]. It should also be noted that most of the GDPR’s data protection
principles are out of the scope of the current implementation of our system and therefore
cannot be reliably evaluated.
The principle, however, is very specific and should be perceived as mandatory when
developing a system that processes personal information in any way, shape or form.
4) AI-Based systems must be transparent. This principle argues that a system must
be transparent, explainable and traceable. This means that it should be possible for legal
persons or individuals to trace how a decision that affects them was made. Explainability
can be done in several ways. Some examples are that a system can show what input data
was used and how this data affects the results, how precise the system is, or how changes
to some instance in the system affects the result [14]. In our system we have implemented
an overview of all the children’s input data. However this should only be available to the
operators of the system. Present issues with our allocation system is that while it would be
possible for a parent to see their own input data, it would not be possible for individuals to
gain full insight in all input data for other children due to privacy concerns. Several pieces
of sensitive information are used, and it would be against national privacy regulations as
well as the GDPR to give insight to others into this data. This means that a individual
will not be able to see how the whole decision process was conducted, and therefore the
principle cannot be implemented to its full extent in our proposed system.
5) AI systems must facilitate inclusion, diversity and equal treatment Principle
five discloses that AI must contribute to inclusion and avoid discrimination. In addition,
datasets used for training of AI systems should be avoided if they contain historical
bias, are incomplete or incorrect. Our system makes decisions solely based on the
Bergen municipality criteria for kindergarten admission. We assume that these criteria
are developed to promote equality. Employees that conduct manual allocation of children
can be prone to giving preferential treatment to children and families they know, which
can lead to unequal treatment. This is assuming that the employees have access to some
identifiable data such as names of children/parents. A system such as ours will not be
prone to giving such treatment, and therefore conduct a more equal allocation.
6) AI must benefit society and the environment What is beneficial for society is
a broad question to answer, as it depends on what is actually considered “beneficial”.
Automating processes in general can have several implications on a societal level, both
positive and negative. Automation can free up the human workforce for a specific task,
and these resources can be used on other tasks that are not automated yet, or not possible
to automate. These resources can either be laid off, if no alternative work is provided, or
they can be used for other tasks that are not possible to automate. A report by Oxford
economists states that 47% of total US employment is in the risk of being automated [8].
Automation of tasks does not always lead to negative consequences such as layoffs. As
an example, Bergen municipality saves 12 full-time employment positions by automating
a simple form filling task, and uses these resources on other tasks to improve services for
their citizens [4]. This is an example that shows how automation can be a change in the
nature of work. Resources can be allocated to non-automatable tasks which for example
requires creativity or social skills [21].
7) Accountability This principle complements the other listed above, and entails the
introduction of mechanisms to ensure accountability for solutions built on AI and for
their outcomes both before and after the solutions are implemented. This principle does
not state who is to be held accountable, but rather states that there must be at least one
entity that can be held accountable for eventual wrongdoings by the system. In a system
such as ours, several stakeholders are involved, and thus several legal entities can be
held accountable such as the municipality, or the creators of the system which could
either be ”in house” or external. We have not implemented or considered such measures
in our system, but we provide an example of a framework below that can be used for
implementing such measurements.
Berscheid & Rowewer-Despres [5] propose a three party regulatory framework
between developers (an entity or person that creates an AI system), clients (entity or
person that intends to deploy the AI system) and the subject (an entity or person that is the
target of the deployed system). The client would be the municipality that uses the system,
and the subject is the children, or the parents of the children. The framework proposes
a regulatory system where a pair of documents needs to be filed for any autonomous
decision-making system. The first document consists of an AI Validation Document
(AVID) which validates the scope of the system and how the systems decisions can be
interpreted in the case of an audit. The second document is called Deployment Disclosure
Document (DDD) and it identifies the process for deploying an AI. This document can
help to detect fault if a legal challenge should appear in regards to deployment of the
AI. The AVID documents are to be filed first, and be approved to establish the validity
of the application. After the AVID has been approved, the DDD document is filed. The
benefits of using this framework is that developers share knowledge with their clients,
and the clients can have a framework for evaluating and questioning the developers. The
framework also allows for open questions towards the institution that deploys the AI, and
makes it possible to hold the institution accountable.
5 Related Work
We consider the related work on the topic of fair matching of applicants in the context of
kindergartens [12, 22, 10]. Clearly, none of this work considers compliance with NNSAI.
There exist other works, which address similar matching problems in the context of higher
education, and given this overlap we have chosen to include a selected few of these as well
[2, 11, 1]. The works can be categorized according to their scope. While [1, 22, 12] are
focusing more on the implementation details, [11, 17] are about public perception.
Visma [23] is at present developing a solution for automating kindergarten allocation.
Visma Flyt Barnehage takes an automated approach to kindergarten allocation by
implementing the integer programming approach as presented in Geitle et al. [10].
Their algorithm allocates children to kindergartens while respecting children preference
and municipal policies. Visma describes current approaches as manual, varying, and
extremely time consuming. Visma Flyt Barnehage (VFB) offers its solution to a selected
few municipalities. The pilot study is being conducted in cooperation with Tønsberg
municipality. Geitle et al. [10] was published in early 2020 and aligns greatly with our
work. While the subject of Geitle et al. is the same as ours and they use an Integer
Programming Method which solves the problem as a constraint satisfaction program,
rather than a matching program – they use an objective function to describe the priority
of children. They also use three groups of kindergartens, one of them is a dummy
kindergarten for those who do not get any place (we do the same). They do not consider
NNSAI. Their solution includes a set of additional features, such as gender balance, age
balance, travelling time, and partial allocation.
Veski et al. [22] present a redesigned allocation method for kindergartens in Estonia,
using the deferred acceptance algorithm. Efficiency is defined as the ability to meet
predefined goals of satisfying applicant preferences such as bringing together siblings
and minimizing travel. Fairness is based on the idea of equal access invoked from the
probability of the child getting their first preference. The algorithm described in the paper
creates a child-optimal stable matching, primarily prioritising siblings and distance. The
goal of their research was to create a matching policy focusing on efficiency and fairness.
Their research resulted in seven different allocation policies.
Abdulkadiroglu et al. and Kennes et al. [1, 12] address existing weaknesses in the
systems that allow for gaming the matching system by being strategic when assigning
priorities for schools. While these systems are implemented in two separate countries,
they seemingly have the same fallacy. By changing the child’s pre-school the year before
they are due to graduate and move up to primary school, one can in effect manipulate
primary school admittance. To prevent this the authors present two strategy proof
mechanisms to replace the existing one: “The deferred acceptance mechanism” (DAM)
and “The top trading cycles mechanism” (TTCM). These algorithms were then considered
for application in the Boston school system, where in the end the DAM was proven to be
favorable.
Jobin et al., and Marcinkowski et al. [11, 17] focus on the perception of algorithmic
matching systems and the overarching global landscape of AI ethics guidelines. The
discussed matching systems might differ on a local and national level by how much the
factors weigh and even by what sort of matching is performed. However, as outlined in
[11] there is a global interest in these issues and insurance that they are fair, trustworthy,
and transparent. The work presents 11 principles that have been aggregated from a
number of publications, with 88% of these publications being from 2017 or later. While
the NNSAI is not directly mentioned in this study as this study was published the year
before, they are indirectly included. The NNSAI principles are direct derivatives of
the principles published by the EU commissions Independent High-Level Expert Group
on Artificial Intelligence, which are included in the study. The presented principles,
listed according to frequency, are: transparency, justice and fairness, non-maleficence,
responsibility, privacy, beneficence, freedom and autonomy, trust, dignity, sustainability,
and solidarity.
While the NNSAI principles are not directly equivalent to the listed, they can be
understood as more generic and therefore encompass the same notions. One worthy
mention is that the NNSAI does not explicitly mention beneficence, the principles
can therefore be understood as to be harm reducing rather than the opposite. The
ethical principles of the NNSAI are6: 1. Human agency and oversight, 2. Technical
robustness and safety, 3. Privacy and data governance, 4. Transparency, 5. Diversity,
non-discrimination and fairness, 6. Societal and environmental well-being, and 7.
Accountability.
Marcinkowski et al. [17] present a series of hypotheses that address public perception
of automatic decision making (ADM) systems.The findings can be summarized as
supporting in the sense that the public has trust in ADM systems, and even favor them
over a human decision maker due to inherent bias. The authors conclude that perception
of fairness regarding ADM admission systems in universities is very relevant and can
significantly impact the reputation of the university, as well as the amount of students
that choose to study in this university. This can be extrapolated to our research since the
reputation of the communal public services as well as the satisfaction of the parents are
at stake depending on the process and the results of the distribution of children between
kindergartens.
6 Discussion
System. Our system is at this time not suitable to do all the tasks of kindergarten
allocation that is expected by the municipality or law. The system does not satisfy the
following two juridical criteria: a) guaranteed allocation for children who turn one year
old during the year the child applies for kindergarten; b) guaranteed allocation within their
6https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/nasjonal-strategi-for-kunstig-intelligens/id2685594/
birthday month for children who turn one year old in September, October or November
that year. Additionally, the system does not satisfy the municipal criteria of having an
opportunity to appeal the decision of an allocation. Lastly, we have no real world data
about the kindergarten children in the municipality, so we are not able to model our mock
data to reflect the real child population. However, the system we have is still sufficient to
do an initial evaluation of it using the ethical principles of the NNSAI.
Ethical implications. Our system does not have any ethical implications that are
inherent to the system. As long as the scoring is implemented in a way that reflects the
criteria the municipality needs to comply with, there will be no reason for the system
to be unfair based on our definition. We therefore argue that the system is fair and
further stress the importance of proper justification for the included features and attributed
weights. Feature selection would have to be conducted by experts that can provide
sufficient justification for the included features and their weights. The system’s result
will be without negative ethical implications for the children, if the score-system has an
ethically sound foundation, which we assume it will have when it is implemented in a
real life scenario. The system we have designed is an implicit ethical agent [19], where
all ethical considerations are addressed in the system design.
The implementation of a system such as ours could possible cause some employees
that work at the municipality to lose their jobs. This is not related to the development of
the system or the ethical behavior of the system, but rather a possible consequence of the
implementation of the system. In this sense our system is also an ethical-impact agent
[19].
By developing our system we allow for the possibility of implementing a far more
advanced system of how kindergartens prioritize children, than what is currently used by
the municipalities in Norway. It is possible to have an almost unlimited number of factors
in the decision process, instead of just the few that are utilized now. The possibility
to make a more advanced score-system can cause ethical implications. For example,
politicians can enforce policies that affect the score-system, and result in more diversified
or segregated kindergartens. This raises the question of who is responsible for this system,
the creators or those who manage it, or both. By making this system, we at least act as
facilitators of these possibilities.
7 Summary
We here considered an algorithmic matching system for assigning children to
kindergartens and explored to which extend it maintains the ethical principles in the
NNSAI. We demonstrated that our system is successful at solving the fundamental
processes of the kindergarten allocation problem. We also discuss each of the seven
ethical principles of the NNSAI. The first principle in the NNSAI is hard to implement
in a system that uses a stable matching algorithm. The nature of the algorithm does not
allow for people to reserve themselves against being handled by it, as is the desire of the
first NNSAI principle. The stable match algorithm needs an equal amount of children
and kindergarten places to be able to work, so what happens to the children that does not
want to be handled by the algorithm? We cannot handle them manually since this can
be unfair to the rest of the children, since they can get a favourable position when not
handled by the algorithm. We cannot put them directly in the waiting list (last priority)
since this will neglect the value of the principle, and in practice will not give the child (or
its parents) a choice of autonomy and control. The NNSAI guidelines accept that not all
principles can be implemented in an AI system, and that in this case a good reasoning and
documentation should be provided. Our reason for not implementing this principle is that
it conflicts with the nature of the algorithm, and the person who wishes not to be handled
by the algorithm will be put in a disadvantage.
We can implement a mechanism for the people that do not want to be handled by the
algorithm and leave it at that, even if they get a disadvantage, just so that we comply with
the ethical principles. But we do not consider this a good solution as it goes against the
intent of the principle. This leaves us with the ironic conclusion that it can be more ethical
not to follow the ethical principles of the NNSAI. Conflicts do also arise in regards to the
fourth ethical principle that addresses the requirement of transparency, traceability and
explainability. Allowing any subject insight into how decisions were made in the system
by disclosing the input data could violate the national privacy regulations, GDPR, and thus
also conflict with the third ethical principle that addresses privacy and data protection.
We cannot implement all the principles without exceptions. Following from this, the
use of a stable matching algorithm is maybe not the best way to solve the automatic
allocation problem in regards to complying with the ethical principles of the NNSAI. We
can make compromises and it is up for discussion if our reason for not implementing
the first principle is acceptable. If this is acceptable, we can conclude that a stable
matching approach works for making a kindergarten allocation system. If not, the NNSAI
recommends to discard the system approach.
How applicable are the ethical principles of the NNSAI for creating an ethically
compliant AI system? As an advisory framework we consider the principles as partly
applicable for creating an ethically compliant system. It is not helpful or clear in all areas
or with specific challenges, however. For example, in assisting the development of our
score-system the principles are of some help, they advise to facilitate inclusion, diversity
and equal treatment. However, they do not state what to weigh the heaviest of these
three concepts. Since they are partly contradictory (diversity and equal treatment), it is
not very helpful for establishing specific development goals. Either way we are left with
the impression that these principles can be somewhat helpful, but can also be used for
legitimating ethically questionable AI systems. As we saw earlier in the discussion it was
possible to have an (arguably) unethical system, while complying with the principles.
Our research resulted in two contributions, the first is in regards to automating the
children allocation process in Norwegian kindergartens, and the second is providing an
evaluation of the NNSAI ethical principles. Future work can address the limitations of
our proposed system by testing it with real applicant data, requirements and weights. In
regards to NNSAI, it would be interesting to investigate an implementation of our system
that satisfies all ethical principles. Particularly to find a good way to address the principle
of respecting human anatomy and control.
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